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Abstract  
Bayesian theories of perception have traditionally cast the brain as an idealised scientist, 
refining predictions about the outside world based on evidence sampled by the senses. 
However, recent predictive coding models include predictions that are resistant to 
change, and these stubborn predictions can be usefully incorporated into cognitive 
models.   
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There has been widespread interest in predictive coding (PC) models of cognitive 
functioning across the last decade [1]. Initial applications of these models to perception 
suggest that we infer the most likely state of the outside world by minimising prediction 
errors about its contents. More specifically, ‘higher’ neural areas predict the activity of 
‘lower’ areas, and lower areas pass prediction error signals back up the hierarchy. 
Predictions are constantly updated based on these incoming error signals, and this 
iterative message-passing process generates a largely veridical model of the world. This 
bidirectional message-passing process – dubbed ‘Perceptual Inference’ (see Fig. 1) – 
likens perceptual processing to the scientific process. In the same way that an idealised 
scientist may develop hypotheses about the outside world, compare these to collected 
evidence and adjust their ideas accordingly, perceptual systems generate hypotheses 
about the extracranial world, compare these to evidence provided by the senses and use 
the discrepancy to refine their beliefs. The top-down predictions in these schemes 
provide an explanation for a range of neuroscientific phenomena, such as the finding that 
units in low-level sensory regions (e.g., primary visual cortex) can respond to implied 
rather than actual properties of the sensory input (e.g., illusory contours in a Kanisza 
triangle [2]).  
The popularity of PC within the perceptual domain has spurred recent enthusiastic claims 
that the twin concepts of prediction and prediction error may provide a unifying basis for 
perception, cognition and action [1,3]. These PC models have therefore been applied to a 
range of topics in the cognitive and clinical sciences, including language [4], theory of 
mind [5], self-recognition [6], schizophrenia and depression [7]. Such accounts 
emphasize how the machinery of PC explains the flexibility of perception, action and 
cognition in a constantly changing world. However, these models that apply the PC 
concepts have given little attention to a core assumption of PC models – that not all 
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predictions are flexible. Namely, the brain deploys certain stubborn predictions (see Box 
1 for discussion of the PC meaning of ‘prediction’) that are resistant to evidence-based 
updating.  
For example, PC accounts hypothesise that actions are driven by strong sensory 
predictions about the intended state of one’s body. In this process, known as ‘Active 
Inference’ (see Fig. 1), agents do not update their predictions based on ascending sensory 
signals, but instead engage reflexes that ensure the descending prediction comes true [1]. 
For example, if I would like my hand to grasp a cup (intended state) rather than remain 
immobile (current state), the prediction error generated by the mismatch between 
predicted and current states is resolved through reflexes that reconfigure the body in line 
with the predicted (intended) state. A conceptually identical scheme is thought to 
underlie homeostatic control of visceral body states (e.g., such that the body remains at 
the predicted temperature of ~37°C , [8]).  A key postulate in these models is that for a 
top-down prediction to change the state of the world by driving action, it must be 
resistant to revision by sensory evidence. In computational terms, these neural 
predictions are assigned high ‘precision’, which is equivalent to ignoring sensory input 
(prediction errors) that could update them. The possibility that certain predictions are 
evidence-resistant recasts the brain as sometimes operating like a ‘stubborn’ scientist, 
possessing some hypotheses that evidence cannot change [9]. This process is necessary 
for Active Inference. It is not necessary for Perceptual Inference, but stubborn predictions 
are also possible in Perceptual Inference, where predictions are not updated on the basis 
of evidence yet do not result in action [2].  
Incorporating stubborn predictions into cognitive theories could explain some 
phenomena that currently elude accounts which emphasise the ‘flexible’ nature of 
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predictive coding. For example, in computational neuropsychiatry it is frequently 
suggested that disorders which arise through aberrant predictions could be treated 
through behavioural and psychotherapeutic interventions that provide patients with the 
opportunity to learn the ‘right thing’ [10]. However, this approach may need careful 
consideration if psychopathologies arise due to aberrations in stubborn predictions, 
which are by definition resistant to learning. For instance, schizophrenia is frequently 
associated with passivity experiences or delusions of control, whereby patients report 
feeling that their movements are in fact caused by an external force [7]. If these delusions 
arise due to an aberration in stubborn predictions concerning whether sensory events 
temporally contingent upon one’s actions are caused by them, these predictions may not 
be changed purely through behavioural learning interventions. Similarly, if depressive 
symptoms arise due to atypical predictions about the controllability of the external world 
[7] and representations of agency emerge through stubborn prediction mechanisms that 
control these states through Active Inference, these beliefs are unlikely to be updated 
simply by providing new sensory evidence.  
Stubborn predictions could also be incorporated into models of typical cognitive 
functioning that are couched in PC frameworks. For example, one recent account [6] 
suggested that the hierarchical, belief-refining machinery of PC provides an ideal basis 
for understanding how the brain generates deep multimodal representations required 
for self-recognition. These models can accommodate the flexibility of self-
representations (e.g. where a rubber hand is incorporated into one’s body) through the 
notion that predictions about what constitutes ‘my body’ can be revised on the basis of 
co-occurring visual, tactile and proprioceptive signals. However, updating 
representations about which sensory inputs belong to ‘my body’ may depend upon the 
stubborn prediction that I only possess one body, with the inputs belonging to it being 
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spatially and temporally coincident. If one allowed these high-level predictions to change 
in the face of sensory evidence (e.g., when seeing four of one’s own hands while standing 
next to a mirror) some peculiar representations of the self would likely emerge. Some 
other basic perceptual beliefs may also be resistant to change, e.g., it may be difficult to 
change the expectation that light comes from above or that falling objects will accelerate 
at a rate specified by gravity [2]. These represent situations where the predictions have 
generally always been true, both for the individual’s ancestors and in their own learning 
environment. 
When incorporating these predictions, it is important to consider the likely multiple and 
interacting causes for stubbornness. Some predictions are stubborn because they are 
necessary for survival (e.g., adaptive body temperature). These predictions will likely 
have been established phylogenetically, often through changes to neural structure (e.g., 
relatively few bottom-up projections in relevant neural regions) and will be impossible 
to change. Other predictions may become stubborn through ontogenetic processes (see 
Box 1), which could provide a principled explanation of ‘sensitive periods’ in 
development. Understanding the cause of stubbornness is especially important when 
attempting to alter such predictions. For example, drugs and psychotherapy frequently 
have synergistic effects in treating a variety of conditions. Given that many disorders are 
associated with aberrant neuromodulatory systems, and that PC proposes that 
neuromodulators control the relative weights given to top-down predictions and bottom-
up evidence [10], pharmacological treatments are perhaps best conceptualised as 
interventions on the flexibility of beliefs (or equivalently, on the weighting of evidence) 
and indeed may be necessary if some stubborn predictions are ever to be altered.  
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In conclusion, the predictive brain may often function as a stubborn, rather than idealised 
scientist, failing to update predictions on the basis of sensory evidence. This element of 
PC frameworks has been largely overlooked within the cognitive sciences but 
incorporating stubborn predictions into cognitive models couched in hierarchical PC can 
aid their explanation of cognitive function in both health and disease.  
 
Box 1: The meaning of ‘prediction’ in predictive coding and the cognitive sciences 
Stubborn PC predictions may have received little attention by many cognitive scientists 
partly due to different understandings of ‘prediction’ between disciplines. Cognitive 
scientists typically equate predictions with expectations that reflect the sampled 
statistics of our environment [2], and these expectations will therefore tend to be flexible. 
In contrast, any descending cortical signal can constitute a prediction in PC. This 
reasoning reflects the fact that PC typically construes predictions as any mechanism that 
provides information about the likely distribution of environmental states, even if this 
distributional information is not known to the animal [1]. For example, the fact that line 
detectors in the visual system are connected to shape detectors can be thought of as a 
stubborn structural prediction that certain arrangements of lines (shapes) are more 
likely than others.  Some stubborn predictions may be acquired through genetic ‘priors’ 
[11] embodying information about the kind of world we inhabit (e.g., adaptive body 
temperature). However other stubborn predictions may emerge via learning. For 
instance, learning about strong predictive relationships between events can ‘block’  or 
‘overshadow’ learning about other relationships and the weight we give to new evidence 
in updating our beliefs declines when we estimate we are in a stable world [12].  
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Figure and legend 
 
 
Fig 1: How information flows through the cortical hierarchy in predictive coding. 
In Perceptual Inference, sensory information (e.g. from the eyes) is conveyed up the 
hierarchy by prediction error units (red) to adjust prediction signals (blue). Activity in 
the prediction units is adjusted based on signals from the error units to minimise 
prediction error (i.e., prediction activity at timepoint t reflects predictions and error 
signals from timepoint t-1). Minimising prediction error generates veridical 
representations of the world. In Active Inference, the prediction error is instead reduced 
by peripheral reflexes (e.g. that move the hand) to change states of the body and the world 
in line with predictions. This process involves assigning greater weight to top-down 
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predictions (saturated blue arrows), which is equivalent to reducing the weight given to 
incoming sensory evidence (unsaturated red arrows). Therefore, predictions are 
resistant to revision through sensory evidence (i.e., activity at timepoint t is similar to t-
1, providing the intended state remains the same) and are therefore ‘stubborn’. 
